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Abstract—The Internet Protocol (IP) is the lifeblood of the
modern Internet. Its simplicity and universality have fueled the
unprecedented and lasting global success of the current Internet.
Nonetheless, some limitations of IP have been emerging in recent
years. Its original design envisaged supporting perhaps tens of
thousands of static hosts operating in a friendly academic-like
setting, mainly in order to facilitate email communication and
remote access to scarce computing resources. At present IP
interconnects billions of static and mobile devices (ranging from
supercomputers to IoT gadgets) with a large and dynamic set
of popular applications. Starting in mid-1990s, the advent of
mobility, wirelessness and the web substantially shifted Internet
usage and communication paradigms. This accentuated long-
term concerns about the current Internet architecture and
prompted interest in alternative designs.
The U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) has been one
of the key supporters of efforts to design a set of candidate
next-generation Internet architectures. As a prominent design
requirement, NSF emphasized “security and privacy by design”
in order to avoid the long and unhappy history of incremental
patching and retrofitting that characterizes the current Internet
architecture. To this end, as a result of a competitive process,
four prominent research projects were funded by the NSF in
2010: Nebula, Named-Data Networking (NDN), MobilityFirst
(MF), and Expressive Internet Architecture (XIA). This paper
provides a comprehensive and neutral analysis of salient security
and privacy features (and issues) in these NSF-funded Future
Internet Architectures. It also compares the four candidate
designs with the current IP-based architecture and discusses
similarities, differences, and possible improvements.
Index Terms—network security, privacy, trust, future internet
architectures
I. INTRODUCTION
THE original Internet was intended to support thousandsof users, mainly in North America, accessing shared
resources via dumb terminals. Nowadays, the Internet connects
over 3 billion of mobile and desktop devices with a variety
of applications ranging from simple web browsing to video
conferencing and content distribution. These extreme changes
in Internet usage accentuated limitations of the current IP-
based architecture and prompted research into alternative in-
ternetworking architectures.
In 2010, the National Science Foundation (NSF) launched
its “Future Internet Architecture” (FIA) program [1]. Origi-
nally, FIA was a 5-year program with the goal of designing
a set of candidate next-generation Internet architectures. In
2015, NSF renewed its commitment with a follow-on “Future
Internet Architecture – Next Phase” (FIA-NP) program. Unlike
FIA which focused on architectural research, FIA-NP empha-
sizes evaluation, via prototypes, testbeds, trial deployments,
and extensive experimentation.
FIA originally included four research projects: Neb-
ula [2], [3], Named-Data Networking (NDN) [4], MobilityFirst
(MF) [5], and eXpressive Internet Architecture (XIA) [6].
Each project focuses on a new Internet architecture with
a distinct vision and design principles. Nebula envisions a
highly-available and extensible core network interconnecting
numerous data centers that enable new means of distributed
communication and computing. NDN focuses on scalable and
efficient data distribution – thus addressing inadequacies of
the current Internet’s host-centric design – by naming data
instead of its location. MobilityFirst concentrates on scalable
and ubiquitous mobility and wireless connections. Meanwhile,
XIA stresses flexibility and addresses the need to support
different communication models by creating a single network
that offers inherent support for communication between var-
ious principals (including hosts, content and services) while
remaining extensible to future ones. Only three of the original
four FIA architectures were selected for continued funding un-
der FIA-NP: NDN, MobilityFirst and XIA. Figure 1 illustrates
the timeline of each project in FIA and FIA-NP programs.
Fig. 1. Timeline of FIA & FIA-NP programs
From the very beginning, one of FIA’s key goals (and
requirements) is strong support for security and privacy in
all future Internet architectures. Given the rocky history of
security and privacy in the current Internet, this goal is both
very sensible and extremely important.
In this paper, we survey and evaluate security and privacy
features in aforementioned four FIA projects. In doing so, we
consider the network layer of the current Internet architecture
as a point of reference. We also show how each FIA archi-
tecture succeeds, exceeds or fails with respect to security and
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privacy features of current Internet’s network layer, i.e., Inter-
net Protocol (IP) [7] and IP Security Extensions (IPSec) [8].
We also discuss potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited
to attack transmission channels, end-nodes, and the network
infrastructure. Since different types of resolution services are
needed in all FIA architectures, we compare such security and
privacy features of such services to those of Domain Name
System (DNS) [9] and DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
[10].
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the
first comprehensive security and privacy treatment of four
FIA architectures. Since it is impossible to predict which FIA
architecture(s), if any, will ultimately succeed, we strive to
remain neutral, i.e., to provide a complete and fair analysis of
security and privacy of these architectures.
Prior FIA surveys. An early article by Pan et al. [11]
overviews Global Environment for Network Innovations
(GENI). Unlike this paper, [11] provides a general overview
and does not dwell on security and privacy aspects. The work
in [12] provides a security analysis of the four NSF-founded
FIA architectures, plus Recursive InterNetwork Architecture
(RINA), Service Oriented Network Architecture (SONATE),
and Netlet-based Node Architecture (NENA). The analysis
in [12] considers four security features: confidentiality, in-
tegrity, availability and authentication. Our work focuses on
the four NSF-funded FIA architectures, with the aim of pro-
viding a more detailed investigation and comparison of a larger
set of security features. Futhermore, different from [12], we
analyze the security of NSF-funded FIA architecture resolution
services.
Other (more focused) surveys addressed security and pri-
vacy aspects of Information-Centric Networking (ICN) ar-
chitectures [13]–[16]. Also, [13] analyzed security and pri-
vacy of NDN without comparison with the current Internet
architecture. [14] investigates denial of service attacks in
NDN, and [15], [16] provide a more complete analysis of
security in various ICN architectures. It focuses on various
attacks: Naming Related Attacks, Routing Related Attacks,
Caching Related Attacks and Miscellaneous attacks. Instead,
[16] distinguishes between security, privacy and access control
in ICN.
Other surveys in the literature that focus on ICN architec-
tures do not primarily focus on security and privacy aspects
[17]–[20]. [17] analyzes Data-Oriented Network Architecture
(DONA), Named Data networking, Publish-Subscribe Inter-
net Routing Paradigm (PSIRP) and Network of Information
(NetInf). It focuses on naming, routing and forwarding, and
caching and mobility. Moreover, [17] marginally considers
security and privacy aspects. Bari et al. [18] compare the
different naming and routing scheme adopted by DONA,
NetInf, PURSUIT and PSIRP architectures. [19], [20] compare
the mobility features of NDN, DONA, NetInf, PURSUIT.
None of [18]–[20] discusses security and privacy features.
Organization. We begin by overviewing IP, IPsec, DNS
and DNSSEC in Section II. Next, sections IV through VI
summarize Nebula, NDN, MobilityFirst and XIA, respectively.
Section VII evaluates security and privacy features of these
architectures, and compares them with those of IP and IPsec.
Section VIII analyzes security and privacy of resolution ser-
vices used by each new architecture. Section IX summarizes
our comparative analysis, and higlights open issues, and pos-
sible future research directions. Finally, Section X concludes
our paper.
II. THE INTERNET OF TODAY
Today’s Internet architecture was designed over three
decades ago to seamlessly inter-connect multiple heteroge-
neous networks. At the core of today’s Interenet is the TCP/IP
protocol suite, which puts together protocols, applications and
network mediums, and organizes them into four abstraction
layers: Link, Internet, Transport and Application. This design
leads to an hourglass shape with IP as the network layer as
its “thin waist” [21].
We consider IP, which operates at the Internet layer, to be
our point of reference when analyzing security and privacy
of FIA architectures. IP is responsible for forwarding packets
(a.k.a. datagrams) from the source IP interface to its destina-
tion counterpart. A host may have one or more IP interfaces,
while a router has at least two. Each IP interface is identified
by a distinct fixed-length IP address.
Another fundamental component of today’s Internet ar-
chitecture, and subject of our analysis, is DNS. DNS is a
distributed service that translates application-specific domain
names (specified in URLs) into their corresponding IP ad-
dresses, allowing hosts to communicate using meaningful
names, rather than IP addresses.
In what follows, we briefly describe IP and DNS.
A. Internet Protocol
The cornerstone of IP is addressing of network devices.
Every network-layer entity (router or host) is identified by at
least one IP address which consists of a network prefix and a
host identifier. The boundary between them is flexible, which
allows IP addressing to scale.
An IP datagram contains source and destination addresses
along with other fields that convey control information. Actual
data is carried in the payload field. When a packet is received,
a router searches its Forwarding Information Base (FIB) to
identify the next hop for that packet. A FIB contains a set
of entries, each mapping one or more network prefixes to
a router’s interface and a next-hop IP address. This allows
routers to perform longest-prefix matching on the destination
address to identify the next hop. If a packet can not be
forwarded, it is dropped and an error message is generated
via the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [22].1
One important IPv4 feature is packet fragmentation. If the
size of an IP packet is larger than the forwarding interface’s
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) [23], the packet must be
divided into smaller chunks, called fragments. A destination
host must reassemble fragments to recover the original packet.
Other network entities, such as Network Address Translation
1ICMP is also used for sending control messages, such as routing redirect
for networks and hosts.
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tables (NATs) [24], [25] and firewalls might also assemble
fragments.
As mentioned earlier, IP was originally designed for a
small and realtively amicable research community. Neither
its longevity nor its popularity was foreseen. Thus, it is
unsurprsing that IP lacks any security and privacy features.
In late 1980-s and early 1990-s, as IP started to gain global
popularity and the Internet transcended into the commercial
sector, IPsec suite [8] was designed to provide basic security
services, such as: origin authentication, data integrity, and
confidentiality for IP datagrams. The first two are attained via
Authentication Header (AH) protocol [26], while Encapsula-
tion Security Payload (ESP) protocol [27] provides all three
security features. IPsec supports two modes of operation:
• Transport: provides end-to-end communication, e.g.,
client-server communications. Only packet payloads are
encrypted and authenticated in transport mode. Transport
and application layers of packets are secured by a hash,
thus, they can not be modified, e.g., using NAT. NAT-
Traversal (NAT-T) [28] is developed to overcome this
issue.
• Tunnel: typically used between gateways to provide a
secure connection (pipe) between physically separate
networks, e.g., different sites of the same organization.
Tunnel mode also supports secure host-to-gateway com-
munication. An IP packet is encrypted in its entirety and
encapsulated as a datagram with a new outer IP header.
One popular application of tunnel mode is Virtual Private
Networks (VPN) [29].
IPv6 [30] is a newer version of IP developed to overcome some
limitations of IPv4. One of its main new features is extended
128-bit address space (as opposed to 32 bits in IPv4). Another
departure from IPv4 is lack of in-network fragmentation.
Before sending an IP datagram must first discover the smallest
MTU on the path to the destination and fragment the datagram
accordingly. To help with this, the Path MTU Discovery
protocol [31] was designed and implemented. IPv6 also takes
into consideration security and privacy by implementing some
features similar to IPsec – such as AH and ESP – as extension
headers [32].
In the rest of this paper, we use the term “IP” to refer to
both IPv4 and IPv6, unless otherwise specified.
B. Domain Name System
The purpose of DNS is translation of domain names (e.g.,
those found in URL prefixes) into IP addresses. Domain names
are organized in a hierarchical fashion: a top-level domain
(e.g., “.com”) is followed by many sub-level domains (e.g.
second-level domain “example.com”, and third-level do-
main “sub.example.com”). For each domain, DNS assigns
an authoritative name server that stores information of, and
responds to queries for, a specific contiguous portion of the
domain name space, called DNS zone. This information is
contained in Resource Records (RR-s) – basic DNS elements
which are also carried in DNS replies. Moreover, authoritative
name servers might delegate authority over sub-domains to
other name servers, thus increasing DNS’s scalability.
A user interacts with DNS by issuing a query to a local
resolver: a process running on the end-user’s device which
forwards the query to the appropriate name server(s). The
resolver sends a UDP (User Datagram Protocol [33]) packet
containing the query to the DNS server, which is usually
located in the resolver’s local network. The server then checks
if it can reply to the query from its cache. Otherwise, it fetches
the response from other local or remote DNS servers.
DNS queries can be of two types: iterative or recursive. An
iterative query allows a DNS server to return the best answer
to the resolver, based on its local information, i.e., either a
cached RR or an RR belonging to its zone. If the server does
not have an exact match for the queried name, it returns a
referral: a pointer to a DNS server authoritative for a lower
level of the domain namespace. The resolver then queries the
DNS server in the referral which can also reply with a referral.
This process continues until the resolver receives requested
information, or an error is generated. In the recursive query,
DNS servers reply with either the requested RR or an error.
If the DNS server does not have the requested information, it
recursively queries other DNS servers.
Although DNS was originally designed as a static dis-
tributed database, it now allows dynamic records updates
[34], [35] and zone transfers [36]. Also, a recent proposal
envisions DNS as a distributed database to store IP related
information [37]. For instance, [38] proposes storing IPsec
keys related information in DNS records and mapping them
to IP addresses.
The original DNS did not include any security or privacy
features. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) was added
to provide data integrity and origin authentication for DNS
messages. In DNSSEC, RR-s are signed by their authoritative
servers’ keys. The basic mechanism and the query-response
protocol of DNS remain unaltered.
III. NEBULA
Nebula [2], [3], [39] is a FIA project focused on providing
a secure and cloud-oriented networking infrastructure. Its
architecture is composed of three tiers:
• Network core (NCore) is a collection of routers and
interconnections that provide reliable connectivity be-
tween routers and data centers. NCore is based on high-
performance core routers and rich interconnected topolo-
gies [40].
• Nebula Virtual and Extensible Networking Techniques
(NVENT) represents the control plane of Nebula.
NVENT helps in establishing trustworthy routes based
on policy routing [41] and service naming [42].
• Nebula Data Plane (NDP) is responsible for routing
packets along the paths established by NVENT. To
guarantee confidentiality, availability, and integrity, NDP
ensures that packets for a specific communication can
only be carried when all parties, i.e., end nodes and
routers in between, have agreed to participate.
A. Nebula Network Layer
The original design of Nebula specifies different candidate
network layer stacks for NDP [2], e.g., ICING [43], TorIP [44],
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and Transit-as-a-Service (TaaS) [45]. From this list, ICING
was picked as the most suitable candidate and was included
in the Zodiac Nebula prototype implementation [3].
ICING provides a new primitive, called Path Verification
Mechanism (PVM), which guarantees the following two prop-
erties:
• Path Consent – every entity in a path between two
hosts consents the use of the whole path before the
communication starts.
• Path Compliance – the possibility for each node in a path
between two hosts to verify that a received packet: (1)
follows the approved path; and (2) has been “correctly”
forwarded by all the previous nodes in the path, i.e.,
according to a specific pre-established policy.
ICING can be deployed either at the network layer or as an
overlay on top of IP. In the former case, service providers can
deploy ICING nodes as ingress gateways to their networks.
However, in the latter case, ICING nodes may become way-
points, interconnected using IP, providing waypoint-level path
guarantees.
To start communication, a sender must first establish a
complete path. Such a path can be provided by DNS with
policy enforcement [43]. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show how
forwarding works in ICING and a high-level representation
of how the ICING header evolves.
Once a path is selected, the sender requests a Proof of
Consent (PoCj), for each node j on the path (action 1 in
Figure 2(a)). PoCs are cryptographic tokens created by each
node transit provider, which attest to the provider’s consent to
carry packets along the specified path. Each PoC certifies that
the corresponding network provider consents to (1) the full
path, and (2) a specific policy-based set of local actions (e.g.,
forwarding) to be performed on packets traversing the path.
PoCs are generated by a consent server, which is owned by the
transit provider or acts on its behalf. Such servers share secret
keys with each node (router) in their corresponding providers.
Once all PoCs are received, the path is established and packet
transmission can begin.
Each packet contains a header (shown in Figure 2(b))
including: (1) the path P consisting of all ICING nodes Nj
forming it, and, (2) a list of verifiers Vj , one per node Nj in
the path except the sender. This allows each verifier to prove
that the packet passed through all previous nodes.
A sender builds a packet header as follows:
1) Proof of Provenance (PoP) token, one for each node on
the path (action 2 in Figure 2(b)), is generated using
a PoP key kj shared with the corresponding node j. In
Figure 2(b), PoPs are denoted as PoPi,j , where i is the
index of the node generating the PoP and j is the index of
the node for which PoP is generated. Specifically, PoP0,j
is computed by node 0 using kj , path P , and message
M itself.
2) Authenticator Aj is computed for each node j using
PoCj , P and M .
3) Verifiers Vj , one per node, are computed by XORing the
corresponding Aj and PoPi,j .
PoP tokens are used by each node on the path to prove that
downstream nodes have handled the received packets based
on the established policies. When an intermediate node Ni
receives a packet, it performs the following actions:
1) Computes the corresponding PoCi.
2) Computes PoPj,i using kj , for each downstream node Nj .
3) Verifies that the received PoCi and PoPj,i match the
two values computed in the previous two steps. If this
verification fails, Ni drops the packet.
4) Derives a shared PoP key kl, for each upstream node Nl,
and computes PoPi,l as described above.
5) Modifies the verifiers to include the computed PoP, and
forwards the packet upstream (actions 3 and 4 in
Figures 2(a) and 2(b)).
The previous steps allow any node to guarantee that all packets
are forwarded by all the consenting nodes while establishing
the path.
B. Nebula Control Plane
The control plane in Nebula is provided by NVENT.
NVENT uses declarative networking [46], [47], and allows
administrators to provide high-level specifications of their
routing policies. NVENT also involves special interfaces,
called service interfaces, that enable service access and specify
the required level of availability. For instance, an emergency
service can request high availability, which can be provided
by multi-path interdomain routing. A distributed resolution
service is used for discovery of other NVENT services. This
service is populated by service providers, e.g., NCore data
centers [48].
Serval is an implementation of NVENT based on the con-
cept of service-centric networking [49], [50], which decouples
service instances (e.g., web or email services) from their physi-
cal locations (i.e., IP address and port). Serval introduces a new
layer, the Service Access Layer (SAL), between the network
layer and the transport layer. With Serval, each service is
identified by a serviceID, a unique identifier that applications
use to communicate with the service. In addition, each local
traffic flow, representing a connection between two hosts, is
identified by a unique flowID. The request is handled by SAL,
which uses local control plane policies to map the serviceID to
a service instance. SAL eventually creates a new flowID that
identifies the established connection. This flowID is delivered
to the destination host during connection setup, and used by
both parties for connection identification. Finally, SAL routes
the packet based on specific control plane rules contained in
its SAL table. For instance, a host application that wants to
connect to a specific service might direct the first request to
a default Serval router (using its IP address). The SAL of the
router then processes the request and take further decisions
based on its SAL table (e.g., forward to another router or send
directly to a known service instance). Moreover, Serval does
not directly provide clients a way to learn serviceIDs: It simply
suggests the use of directory services or search engines [42].
Figure 3 presents a view of how all Nebula components
integrate to allow a user to negotiate a custom end-to-end
path to a specific data center and send the desired packets.
First, the user (either the mobile phone or the laptop in the
figure) contacts NVENT to request a path to NCore. NVENT
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(a) Packet forwarding in ICING.
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(b) ICING packet high-level structure.
Fig. 2. ICING architecture.
determines a suitable path that complies with each transit
network’s policies and contacts the corresponding consent
servers to obtain the necessary PoCs. Once the path and all
PoCs are delivered to the user, the latter generates appropriate
packet headers and forwards them, using the NDP forwarders
network, to the nearest NCore router. This router ensures that
all header fields are valid (as described above) and verifies that
the negotiated path has actually been traversed. Once verified,
the core router forwards received packets to the correct data
center using its NCore links.
NCore router
NDP forwarder
NDP Policy/Consent server
NVENT APIs and virtualization
NVENT Policy-based path discovery
Data
Center
Realm 2 Realm 1
Fig. 3. High-level view of Nebula components integration
IV. NAMED-DATA NETWORKING
While IP traffic consists of packets sent between com-
municating end-points, NDN traffic is comprised of explicit
requests for, and responses to, named content objects. NDN
is based on the principle of Content-Centric Networking,
where content, rather than hosts, occupies the central role in
the architecture. NDN is primarily oriented towards efficient
large-scale content distribution. Rather than directly addressing
specific hosts, NDN users (called consumers) request pieces
of content by name. The network is in charge of finding the
closest copy of the content, and delivering it. This decoupling
of content and location allows NDN to efficiently implement
multicast, content replication and fault tolerance.
A. NDN Network Layer
The NDN network layer uses hierarchical structured names
to directly address content. Names are composed of a num-
ber of human-readable components, e.g. /ndn/bbc/frontpage/news
where “/” represents the boundary between name components.
Since names are opaque to the network, they can contain
binary components.
To support content distribution, NDN defines two types of
packets: interest and content (the latter is also called data
packet). NDN communication adhered to the pull model, that
is: every content is delivered to consumers only upon explicit
request. Specifically, a consumer issues an interest packet
carrying the name of the desired content. The network will
then forward the interest towards the producer.
One important feature of NDN is in-network caching: any
router can store a copy of the content it receives or forwards,
and use it to satisfy subsequent interests. Therefore, an NDN
interest might be satisfied by the actual content producer or
any intermediate router. Along with in-network caching, NDN
introduces another important feature called interest collapsing:
only the first of multiple closely spaced (and timed) interests
requesting the same content is forwarded by each router.
Each NDN entity (not only routers) maintains the following
three components [4]:
• Content Store (CS) – cache used for content caching and
retrieval. A router’s cache size is determined by local
resource availability. Each router unilaterally determines
what content to cache and for how long. From here on,
we use the terms CS and cache interchangeably.
• Forwarding Interest Base (FIB) – table of name prefixes
and corresponding outgoing interfaces. FIB is used to
route interests based on longest-prefix matching of their
names.
• Pending Interest Table (PIT) – table of outstanding (pend-
ing) interest names and a set of corresponding incoming
interfaces, denoted as arrival-interfaces
When an NDN entity receives an interest, it searches its PIT
to determine whether another interest for the same content is
pending. There are three possible outcomes:
1) If a PIT entry for the same name exists, and the arrival
interface of the present interest is already in arrival-
interfaces, the interest is discarded.
2) If a PIT entry for the same name exists, yet the arrival
interface is new, the router appends the new incoming
interface to arrival-interfaces, and the interest is not
forwarded further.
3) Otherwise, the router looks up its cache for a matching
content. If it succeeds, the cached content is returned and
no new PIT entry is needed. Conversely, if no matching
content is found, the router creates a new PIT entry and
forwards the interest using its FIB.
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Upon receipt of the interest, the producer (or an intermediate
router) responds with a matching content, thus satisfying the
interest. The content is then forwarded towards the consumer,
traversing the reverse path of the preceding interest. Each
router on the path flushes the corresponding PIT entry and
forwards the content out on all interfaces specified by that
entry. If a content is received by a router with no prior
matching interest, the content is considered unsolicited and is
discarded. Since no additional information is needed to deliver
content, interests do not carry any form of source addresses.
The last component at the end of content name can carry
an implicit digest (hash) component of the content that is re-
computed at every hop. This effectively provides each content
with a unique name. Names carrying such digest forms what
is called as Self-Certifying Names (SCNs). If an interest is
issued using SCN, the retrieved content is guaranteed, due to
longest-prefix matching, to be the same content requested by
the consumer. However, in most cases, the hash component is
not present in interest packets, since NDN does not provide
any secure mechanism to learn a content hash a priori.
Apart from the name, content packets carry a Signature
generated by the content producer and covering the entire
content. For this reason, each producer is required to have
at least one public key, represented as a bona fide named
content object. Other notable fields in content packets are:
the Payload containing the actual data of the content and
the ContentType defining the type of the content, e.g. data
or key. Other important fields in interest packets are: the
KeyLocator which references to the public key required
to verify the signature, and the InterestLifetime which
specifies the lifetime of an interest before it expires (and its
corresponding PIT entry is flushed).
Similar to IP, fragmentation of NDN packets can not be
avoided. The fact that names can grow arbitrary long might
cause interests length to span beyond some link MTU values.
In this case, fragmentation must occur. However, since FIB
forwarding is based on the availability of the entire name,
reassembling of fragmented interests at every hop is a must.
Furthermore, interest collapsing can cause content objects to
be fragmented (or even re-fragmented) by routers [51]. The
question remains to whether to perform a hop-by-hop reassem-
bly [52], or cut-through processing of content fragments [51].
Regardless of its claimed benefits, it is trivial to see that hop-
by-hop reassembly incurs unnecessary overhead and end-to-
end latency.
Not all interests result in content being returned. If an
interest encounters either: (1) a router that can not forward
it further or (2) a producer that has no matching content, no
error is generated. PIT entries in intervening routers simply
expire when no matching content is received. In such case,
the consumer can choose to re-issue the same interest after a
timeout.
B. NDNS Distributed Database
Since content can be addressed using human-readable
names, NDN in principle does not require a resolution service
that translate user-friendly names into network addresses.
However, as discussed in [53], a distributed database similar
to DNS, if existed, provides several benefits to the NDN
architecture:
• Cryptographic credential management: Since each data
packet is required to be signed, a distributed database is
optimal to store and serve security information (e.g., keys
and certificates) for namespaces.
• Namespace regulation in the global routing: Similar to
the ROVER project [54], a DNS-like service can store
information that certifies the authorization of ASes to
announce a particular prefix in the global routing.
• Scaling NDN routing: The fact that NDN names can
be arbitrary long renders the namespace infinitely large.
This exceeds the number of possible routable IP prefixes.
Therefore, a DNS-like service can be used to implement
a Map-n-encap solution to increase scalability in NDN
routing [55].
Two distributed database systems that resemble the DNS de-
sign, KRS and NDNS, are proposed in [53], [56], respectively.
These two proposals adopt a similar design and provide the
same features. In the rest of this paper we use NDNS to refer
to such a distributed system.
Similar to domain names in DNS, NDNS organizes names-
paces in a hierarchical set of zones and assigns replicated
authoritative servers for each of them. NDNS queries are
expressed via interest, in which, names carry all query’s
necessary information. NDNS responses are carried in content
objects where their payloads contain the information requested
by the corresponding query.
NDNS reflects many of the DNS protocol machineries: a
resolver issues an iterative or recursive query to a local NDNS
server. In case of iterative query, the server can reply with
the answer (if known), a referral, or a negative response. In
case of recursive query, if the NDNS server does not know
the answer, it recursively query another NDNS server until
it receives an answer (i.e., the requested data or a negative
response). Moreover, secure dynamic updates are provided as
in DNS [57].
V. MOBILITYFIRST
MobilityFirst architecture aims to overcome the inefficien-
cies and limitations of today’s Internet due to mobility. It
focuses on scenarios where wireless connections are ubiq-
uitous and pervasive. To this end, MobilityFirst has been
designed around the concepts of mobility and trustworthiness.
All endpoints must be able to seamlessly switch network
connection, and the network must be resilient to compromised
endpoints and routers.
MobilityFirst treats principals – devices, content, interfaces,
services, human end-users, or a collection of identifiers – as
primary addressable network entities. To promote mobility, the
(constant) identity of a principal and its (dynamic) network lo-
cation are strictly separated. This requires a distributed Global
Name Service (GNS) to bind principal identities to network
addresses. Furthermore, identity and network address sepa-
ration (1) facilitates service implementation and deployment,
and (2) supports designing routing protocols that overcome
link fluctuation and disconnections [58].
M. AMBROSIN ET AL. 7
We now briefly describe MobilityFirst’s network layer and
its Global Name Service.
A. Network Layer
Two types of identifiers are used to differentiate between
principal identities and their physical locations.
• Global Unique Identifier (GUID): a flat self-certifying
identifier that uniquely identifies a principal. GUIDs can
be generated using multiple methods depending on the
provided service type. For instance, they can be derived
from the public key of a host or a service principal or the
hash of a content principal. For the sake of usability, a
human readable name can be assigned to a principal and
later resolved (by GNS) to the corresponding GUID.
• Network Address (NA): a flat address that identifies
a network to which a particular principal (GUID) is
connected. MobilityFirst networks are equivalent to ASes
on today’s Internet. NAs can be used to identify finer-
grained networks such as subnets or organizations. In
cases where principals are connected to multiple networks
(e.g., using 3G and WiFi simultaneously), multiple NAs
can correspond to the same principal.
As a consequence of this addressing scheme, MobilityFirst
defines a new packet type called Packet Data Unit (PDU).
PDUs contain source and destination GUIDs, lists of source
and destination NAs, payload, and other control fields.
In order to communicate with a specific GUID, endpoints
need to query GNS to obtain the corresponding NA. The
retrieved tuple (GUID, NA) is then carried in the PDU header
as a routable destination identifier. PDUs are first delivered
to their corresponding destination NAs (using inter-domain
routing), and then to the destination GUIDs (using intra-
domain routing). In case of delivery failure, the packet is stored
inside the network (in routers) and GNS is periodically queried
for a new or updated GUID-NA mapping.
Multihoming, anycast, and multicast are supported by mul-
ticast GUIDs (MIDs). MID has the same format as a regular
GUID, except its resolution results in a set of NAs (instead
of, at most, one). Technically, GNS associates one MID with
several GUIDs (the ones belonging to the multicast group).
Resolving all of them results in one or more elements of the
output NAs set.
MobilityFirst can also support content distribution networks.
In this case, GUIDs are composed of two parts:
• Content GUID (CID): uniquely identifies the content and
is generated by computing the hash of the corresponding
content.
• Publisher GUID (PID): points to the network entity
providing the content. Such an entity can be the actual
content provider, or a third-party content repository.
A router may be equipped with a cache. This opportunistic
caching feature facilitates content distribution at the network
layer by reducing end-to-end latency and bandwidth consump-
tion. Moreover, MobilityFirst exploits in-network caching to
implement a per-segment (i.e., a continuous set of links with
caching routers at each end) reliable chunk (few hundred of
megabytes) transfer. Each chunk is fragmented and transmitted
according to the segment MTU. Then, the caching router at
the other end assembles the entire chunk and stores it. In case
of transferring failure, caching routers can re-transmit a chunk
via the same, or even a different, path.
B. Global Name Service
GNS is an essential part of the MobilityFirst architecture.
Its main task is to map endpoint identifiers (GUIDs or human
readable names) to a set of attributes including the endpoint
network address. GNS relies on the following two services:
• Name Certification Service (NCS): is equivalent to a
Certificate Authority (CA). Its purpose is to (1) assign
GUIDs to human-readable names and (2) attest this
mapping by generating certificates. MobilityFirst allows
multiple NCSs without a global root of trust. Moreover,
if GUID space is large enough, the need for coordination
between different NCSs is eliminated.
• Global Name Resolution Service (GNRS): a distributed
naming service similar to Domain Name System (DNS)
that stores the mapping between GUIDs and NAs [59]–
[61].2 Two GNRS implementations are evaluated: (1)
a distributed hash table maintained among all ASes of
the Internet (DMap [62]), and (2) a number of replica-
controllers that migrate data (GUID-NA mappings) be-
tween a variable number of active replicas (Auspice [63]).
Regardless of its implementation, GNRS clients interact with
the service by issuing the following requests to the GNRS
resolver:
• insert: register a new GUID-NA mapping when a
principal joins the network.
• update: keep the GUID-NA mapping up-to-date when
the corresponding principal migrates to a new network
location.
• query: retrieve the list of NAs associated with a specific
GUID.
In [60], a secure version of the above three GNRS request
types is proposed. The secure insert and update requests
adopt a two-step approach to check validity of a GUID-NA
mapping. Four network entities are involved in this process:
(1) the user issuing the new GUID-NA mapping, (2) the local
router to which the user is connected, (3) the border gateway
router that connects the user’s AS to the rest of the Internet,
and (4) the DHCP server which assigns the user’s address.
The user generates and signs the request containing the
GUID-NA mapping. Local and border routers are in charge of
verifying validity of the announced mapping. This is achieved
by verifying that the announced NA is the network connected
to the user (and the local router), and querying the DHCP
server to ensure that the returned NA corresponds to the
announced GUID. If the NA matches the one contained in
the update or the insert request, the mapping is accepted
and added or updated in the GNRS table.
In the secure query request, the protocol involves three
entities: the user, the border gateway, and GNRS. The user
2GNRS is the actual GNS service that is responsible for maintaining GUID-
NA mappings.
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issues an authenticated request and the border router checks its
validity. The router then forwards the request to the appropriate
GNRS replica. On receipt, the GNRS satisfies the request with
a signed GUID-NA mapping response.
There are several differences [63] between GNRS and
DNS [9]. First, GNRS does not restrict the structure of the
names, while DNS only supports hierarchical names. Second,
scalability of GNRS does not rely on TTL-based caching,
which has been proven to be ineffective in the presence of high
mobility. Third, GNRS does not statically give the authority
to a replicated server for a specific set of names. Active and
on-demand replication reduce reliance on passive caching and
ensure that mapping replicas are always accessible close to
clients.
VI. EXPRESSIVE INTERNET ARCHITECTURE
eXpressive Internet Architecture (XIA) is another research
effort aiming to design a new architecture. XIA is based on
three types of principals. Host-centric networking can support
end-to-end communication, such as video conferencing and
file sharing. Service-centric networking allows users to access
various network services such as printing and data storage
services. Meanwhile, content-centric networking can support
Web browsing and content distribution. However, XIA’s design
is extensible in that it can adaptively provide network evolution
and support any new principal type that might emerge in the
future.
A core architectural property of XIA is intrinsic security
of all principals. Any entity should be able to authenticate
the principal it is communicating with, without trusted third
parties. This can be achieved by binding one or more security
properties with principal names. For instance, using the hash
of a service (or a host) public key as its name allows entities to
verify that they are communicating with the desired principal.
Similarly, binding content with its name can be achieved using
the hash of the content as its name, allowing users to verify
the integrity of a requested content.
XIA defines three main design requirements:
1) All network entities must be capable of clearly expressing
their intent. This is achieved by designing the network to
be principal-centric and allowing in-network optimiza-
tion. Routers can perform principal-specific operations
when receiving, processing, and forwarding packets.
2) The network must be able to adapt to new types of
principals. This is essential to support network evolution.
3) Principal identifiers must be intrinsically secure. This
depends on the principal type, e.g., authenticating hosts in
host-centric networking is different than verifying content
integrity in content-centric networking.
Principal identifiers are denoted as XID, where X defines the
type of principle. For instance, HID identifies a host, SID a
service, NID a network, and CID a content.
A. eXpressive Internet Protocol
In order to comply with the aforementioned requirements,
eXpressive Internet Protocol (XIP) is designed. XIP defines
packet format, addressing schemes, and behavior of all nodes
while processing incoming and outgoing packets from/to var-
ious principal types. One of the main features of the XIP
addressing scheme is flexibility of defining multiple (fallback)
paths to destinations. This prevents downtime and service in-
terruption, especially while gradually deploying new principal
types. An XIP address is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with
several properties:
• Each address is a single connected component.
• Each DAG starts with an untyped entry node and ends
with one or multiple “sink” nodes. Thus, each node in
the address graph has a unique XID except for the entry
node.
• Edges define next hops in the path.
• Multiple outgoing edges of a single node are processed
in the order they are listed.
• Out-degree of each node is upper bounded to restrict
performance overhead.
Using DAGs as a basis for XIP addresses allows applications
to build several “styles” of addresses, such as:
• Shortcut routing – this style, shown in Figure 4(a) is
best suitable for requesting content principal. Each node
has a direct edge to the destination principal CID1, which
enables in-network caching. If a node does not have the
content cached, the fallback path is processed and the
packet is forwarded to the next hop.
• Binding – some services require that communication is
bound to a specific source or destination. For instance, a
service hosted in multiple geographical locations. Users
can establish a session with the closest host providing
this service. Then, all further communications must be
directed to this particular host. Figure 4(b) shows an
example of this addressing style. The first packet is
destined to SID1, i.e. the closest host, while the second
packet is destined to SID1 provided by a specific host
HID1.
• Infrastructure evolution – as mentioned above, XIA
supports gradual network evolution for emerging prin-
cipal types using fallback paths. Figure 4(c) shows an
example of this style. Assume that NID1 is gradually
deploying service SID1. All NID1 routers that are not yet
updated to recognize and process SID1 use the fallback
path through HID1 and HID2.
• Source routing – Figure 4(d) gives an example of this
addressing style, in which the source routes the packet to
the destination through a third party domain and service,
NIDa and SIDa, respectively.
• Multiple paths – this supports recovery from link fail-
ures. An example of this style is shown in Figure 4(e).
Figure 5 shows a high level overview of an XIA router. Its
modular design allows efficient multi-principal processing and
supports network evolution. Each router contains two main
XID-specific processing modules:
• Source XID-specific processing: necessary for certain
XID types. For instance, in case of a reply to a CID
request, the “CID processing” unit can implement in-
network content caching.
• Next Destination XID-specific processing: invoked by
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the Next Destination XID-specific Classifier which de-
termines the appropriate forwarding action. Similar to
source processing, this module consists of several units
that carry on XID-specific operations right before for-
warding the packet.
If all outgoing DAG edges of a node lead to unrecognizable
XIDs, the packet is dropped and an unreachable destination
error is generated. It is the responsibility of user applications to
provide appropriate fallback paths to avoid forwarding failures
at any router. Usually fallback paths are built using well-
supported principals, e.g. HID and NID.
B. Principals
As mentioned above, principals in XIA support emerging
communication paradigm on the current Internet. When intro-
ducing a new principal, the following issues arise:
• What does it mean to communicate with a principal of
this type?
• How is the principal’s unique XID generated and how
does it map to intrinsic security properties?
• What are the source and next destination XID-specific
processing actions that routers should perform and how
can such actions be implemented?
We now describe several principal types and discuss their ad-
dressing schemes, in-router processing behaviors, and security
properties.
1) Network and Host: Network and host principal iden-
tifiers are denoted as NID and HID, respectively. They are
generated by using the public key hash of the network or the
host. Unlike hosts on current Internet, each XIA host has a
unique HID regardless of the interface it is communicating
through. This feature helps support host mobility. In order to
support fallback paths, all XIA routers should implement NID
and HID processing modules.
As mentioned above, the fact that the network and host
addresses are derived from their corresponding public keys
allows users to verify the identity of entities with whom they
are communicating. Furthermore, this security requirement
helps defend against address spoofing, Denial of Service
(DoS), and cache poisoning attacks.
2) Service: Services in XIA represent applications in to-
day’s Internet. Users communicating with a service SID can
use a destination address of the form NID:HID:SID. In
today’s terminology, this is analogous to sending a packet to a
specific host in a specific network and indicating the associated
protocol and port number.
Since different services might require different specialized
processing, implementing in-router source and next destination
processing modules is a challenge. Therefore, routers are
only required to perform default processing, routing, and
forwarding of SID packets. All other specialized processing
should be handled by end-nodes.
SIDs are generated by computing the hash of the service
public key. This inherits security properties similar to NIDs
and HIDs.
3) Content principals: This principal type signifies user’s
intent to retrieve content. Packets carrying content identifiers
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(CID) as destination addresses will be routed all the way
to the node hosting the content. Routers can use a cached
version of the content as a reply to such packets. As mentioned
above, caching is implemented by routers source XID-specific
processing module.
CIDs are generated based on the cryptographic hash of
the content they address. This binds the content to its name,
forming a self-certifying name.
VII. NETWORK-LAYER SECURITY AND PRIVACY
According to NSF, one of the guiding principles for a new
Internet architecture is to provide security and privacy by
design. For this reason, FIA involved projects do not only
focus on improving the network performance, but also on
increasing network security and privacy guarantees.
In this section, we provide a comparison between the
security and privacy features offered at the network layer of
each architecture introduced above, and compare them with
IP and IPsec. We consider the following security and privacy
features that we believe essential to obtain a secure and privacy
preserving communication [64].
• Trust: A feeling of certainty (sometimes based on in-
conclusive evidence) that an entity will behave exactly as
expected.
• Data origin authentication: The corroboration that the
source of the received data is as claimed.
• Peer entity authentication: The corroboration that a peer
entity in an association is the one claimed.
• Data integrity: The property that data has not been
changed, in an unauthorized or accidental manner.
• Authorization and access control: An approval that is
granted to an entity to access some resources and the
protection of such resources against unauthorized access.
• Accountability: The property that ensures that entity
actions can be traced to said entity, which can then be
held responsible.
• Data confidentiality: The property that information is
not made available or disclosed to unauthorized entities.
• traffic flow confidentiality: A confidentiality service to
protect against traffic analysis.
• Anonymous communication: The guarantees that entity
identities being unknown or concealed.
• Availability: The property of being accessible and usable
upon demand by an authorized entity.
A. Trust
IPsec defines trust as a one-way relationship between two
or more entities (hosts or networks). This relationship is
represented using a Security Association (SA). SAs contain
a set of information that can be considered as a “contract”
between the involved entities. This describes security services
and contains security information needed by hosts to protect
the communication.
Entities involved in secure communication in IPsec establish
SAs via the ISAKMP [65] protocol and exchange necessary
cryptographic material using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
protocol [66]. Host authentication in ISAKMP and IKE can
be achieved via either digital signatures, or pre-shared keys.
Digital signatures require the use of certificates to bind entity
identities to their public keys. This implies the existence of a
CA to create, sign, and properly distribute certificates.
Nebula’s ICING-based network layer defines trust in a way
that is orthogonal to IPsec. Trust is defined between a host
and all nodes forwarding its packets. As described in Section
III, a host agrees on a “contract” with the network providers
carrying the data (i.e., the path negotiated using NVENT) to
specify the operation executed at each hop. Such contracts
are cryptographically enforced. ICING assumes mutual trust
between forwarding nodes and their consent servers, i.e.,
servers responsible for creating PoC tokens. Therefore, this
notion of trust does not require any PKI [43]. However, ICING
does not provide an end-to-end definition of trust, which can
be added by adopting an IPsec-like approach.
Unlike IP, the notion of trust in NDN is not directly associ-
ated with hosts and networks, but rather with content. Trust in
content can be expressed at different levels of granularity, from
a single content to an entire namespace. Recall that a content
object is signed by its producer which allows anyone to verify
its origin and authenticity. Origin verification refers to content
producer rather than whoever stores a copy of that content.
In order to authenticate a content and its origin, its signature
must be verified. To do so, the verification (public) key must
be retrieved and trusted.3 However, trust management is not
specified at the network layer and is left to applications. NDN
network-layer trust management in discussed in [67].
MobilityFirst places trust in principal. Depending on their
type, trust may be established with (1) hosts, similar to IPsec,
(2) content, similar to NDN, or (3) centralized or distributed
services. Trust semantics in XIA also vary depending on
principal types. However, the intrinsic security feature of these
principals (described in Section VI) increases trustworthiness
of end-to-end communication and content retrieval. For in-
stance, ensuring that a content hash matches its identifier
allows receivers (and caching routers) to trust that content.
As shown in Section VI, an XIA address consists of a
DAG containing a (partial) path to the destination. To provide
trusted path selection for host-to-host communication, SCION
is integrated with XIA [68]. SCION [69] is an architecture
that provides control and isolation for secure and highly
available end-to-end communication. The network is divided
into multiple trust domains consisting of several Autonomous
Systems (ASes) that trust each other. Each domain has a
trusted root AS responsible for relaying packets to and from
other domains. Roots initiate path establishment to all hosts in
their domains based on local policies and available bandwidth.
This process results in constructing a path between each host
and its domain root. Whenever two XIA hosts, in different
domains, want to communicate, the two half paths (from each
host to its domain root) are combined to establish a complete
end-to-end path. Such path is trusted since it is created by the
trusted roots of each domain.
3Keys in NDN are distributed in content objects with type KEY. Such
objects (keys) are signed by their issuer, e.g., CA.
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B. Data origin authentication
IP (IPv4 in particular) does not provide any form of au-
thentication. A separate add-on method, IPsec, provides entity
authentication via AH and ESP protocols.4 In transport mode,
two hosts securely negotiate a shared secret key. This key is
later used to generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC)
[70] for each packet. Successful MAC verification ensures
authenticity of received packets and their origin. In case of
gateway-to-gateway communication, gateways can only verify
that the received data originated by any (not a specific) host
connected to the network at the other end of the tunnel. In host-
to-gateway communication, the gateway can actually verify
that the data originated by the involved host, while the latter
can only verify that received data is originated by the network
located behind the gateway. This partial authentication opens
the door for insider attacks.
Nebula’s ICING-based network layer does not directly
provide data origin authentication. Instead, it is delegated to
applications. ICING allows a sender to authenticate entities
issuing cryptographic tokens, i.e., PoCs. However, the design
does not specify how PoCs are retrieved or authenticated [43].
NDN provides origin and data authentication via content
signatures. Before consuming content, consumers are required
to verify its signature [4]. However, this operation is optional
for routers because signature verification is an expensive
operation at line speed and comprehensive trust management is
not viable at the network layer. Even if we assume that routers
know all possible application trust models, establishing trust in
content is complicated and expensive. For instance, traversing
a PKI hierarchy requires routers to fetch and verify public key
certificates until a trusted anchor is reached.
On the other hand, NDN interests can optionally be au-
thenticated using digital signature [71]. In a signed interest,
the last component of the name carries a signature computed
by the consumer. Although this reveals consumer identities,
signing signatures (or any other form of identities) are usually
required in some scenarios such as access control.
MobilityFirst and XIA do not provide any data origin and
entity authentication at the network layer. However, their usage
of self-certifying identities as principal identifiers facilitates
entity authentication. Recall that for host, network, and service
principals, identifiers are generated by computing the hash
of the public key associated with these principals. Therefore,
entity authentication can be achieved by ensuring that such
principal identifiers match their keys. Peer authentication for
content principals can be achieved similar to NDN since
such principals are self-authenticating. Neither MobilityFirst
nor XIA provides a secure mechanism for securely retrieving
content identifiers.
C. Peer entity authentication
IPsec provides peer entity authentication during SA estab-
lishment of a secure communication. ISAKMP and IKE, the
IPsec’s protocols used to establish SAs, can achieve peer entity
authentication using digital signature or pre-shared key. Digital
4Recall that IPv6 implements both AH and ESP as extension headers.
signatures requires the use of certificates, which bind entity
identities to their public keys. The use of certificates implies
the existence of a trusted third party or a CA to create, sign and
properly distribute certificates. Pre-shared keys on the other
hand requires the communicating parties to agree on the shared
secret key before communication begins.
In Nebula, ICING allows a sender to authenticate the entities
issuing the necessary cryptographic tokens, i.e., PoCs. How-
ever, ICING design does not specify how PoCs are retrieved,
nor does it specify how entities are authenticated [43].
At its current state, NDN does not provide peer entity
authentication for consumers and producers. However, in case
the authentication of one or both entities is necessary, applica-
tions can exploit some features provided by the network layer.
Considering consumers, signed interests can facilitate their
authentication. Whereas for producers, content signature can
ensure that the content is generated by the expected producer.
Moreover, if interests must be satisfied by producers only (and
not in-network caches), they should carry unique names that
avoid cache hits and guarantee their delivery to corresponding
producers.
Similar to NDN, MobilityFirst and XIA do not provide peer
entity authentication. However, their usage of self-certifying
identities (or names) as principal identifiers facilitates this task.
Recall that for host, network, and service principals, identifiers
are generated by computing the hash of the public key associ-
ated with these principals. Therefore, entity authentication can
be achieved by ensuring that such principal identifiers match
their keys. Also, peer authentication for content principals can
be achieved similar to NDN. Note that neither MobilityFirst
nor XIA provides a secure mechanism for securely retrieving
content identifiers.
D. Data integrity
Although IPv4 header contains the Header Checksum field
that provides transmission error detection (a form of integrity
check), it does not prevent packet manipulation. In fact, both
versions of IP, introduced in Section II-A, completely delegate
integrity to IPsec AH and ESP protocols. Specifically, the
HMAC values in these protocol headers are used to achieve
integrity. Depending on the IPsec mode used, host-to-host,
gateway-to-gateway, or host-to-gateway integrity guarantees
can be provided by both AH and ESP protocols. However,
AH provides integrity for the entire packet (except for mutable
fields), while ESP guarantees packet headers integrity only.
Each packet in Nebula carries a sequence of cryptographic
verifiers Vj , one for each hop on the path (see Section III-A
for details). The packet hash is used as part of Vj’s calculation.
Therefore, ICING guarantees that neither the packet nor the
path can be modified. Also, ICING is recommended only at
domain gateways [43]. Thus, integrity can only be guaranteed
by border routers. Within domains, such guarantees are de-
ferred to either the network-layer protocol or the application.
The way NDN provides integrity is through content sig-
nature. By verifying this signature, consumers and routers
can always detect malicious manipulation. However, when
content is requested using SCNs, data integrity is achieved
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by comparing the content hash to the last name component
of its name. Furthermore, only signed interests can provide
interest integrity.
In both MobilityFirst and XIA, integrity is only available
for content principal types. This is again due to the fact
that such a principal identifier is generated based on the
content hash itself. Whenever a content is received, its hash
is compared with its identifier to ensure content integrity. For
other principal types, MobilityFirst and XIA defer integrity
guarantees to the application.
E. Authorization and access control
Access control in IP is achieved by restricting access based
on source and destination addresses. This is implemented using
Access Control Lists (ACLs) [72], which contain a set of rules
that grant or deny access to network resources. When imple-
mented in routers, ACLs specify whether a received packet
will be forwarded further to the next hop, or simply getting
dropped. Whereas host ACLs are used to decide whether to
forward packets up the stack towards the application. Since IP
does not natively provide packet integrity, address spoofing can
be used to circumvent ACL rules. Employing IPsec, however,
prevents such actions.
In Nebula, paths must be established before communication
begins, i.e., clients must obtain required PoC tokens. There-
fore, access control can be implemented by the consent server
granting or denying PoC requests. Traffic sent without valid
PoC tokens can be easily detected and dropped.
Unlike IP, enforcing access control in NDN should be
done based on content and not network entities. Although not
implemented in practice, ACLs can still be used to implement
access control. In this case, rules are applied on interest
messages and content objects based on the names they carry.
Longest-prefix can also be employed to grant or restrict access
to entire namespaces. Due to the fact that NDN interests do
not carry source addresses, access control on the consumer
granularity can only be achieved in cases where interests are
signed or carry some form of consumer identity [73].
One way of providing access control in NDN is by using en-
cryption. Producers can encrypt their content and disseminate
decryption keys to authorized consumers only. Such keys can
be encapsulated in content objects and should not be cached.
One drawback of this approach is that it requires consumers
to issue at least two interests for each content (one to request
the content itself and one to request the corresponding key).
Since MobilityFirst and XIA can support different principal
types, they facilitate the combination of both NDN- and IP-
based access control schemes. For content principals, access
control is done at the content granularity, similar to NDN,
e.g., content is encrypted using keys disseminated to only
authorized users. For all other principal types, ACLs can
restrict access to hosts and other network services.
F. Accountability
One of the main problems in IP is accountability. In fact, IP
is subject to source address spoofing that lead to the inability
of tracing back the entity responsible for a particular action.
A simple countermeasure against IP spoofing requires ASes
to implement egress filtering and ensure that all outgoing
traffic carries source addresses owned by these ASes. IPsec
guarantees peer entity authentication when establishing SAs
between hosts. Thus, accountability can be achieved.
Nebula provides accountability through path establishment.
All routers on a path consent to use the whole path before the
communication begins. Moreover, the fact that these routers
pre-agree on performing a specific set of actions on each
packet passing through allows the detection of any malicious
activities.
NDN provides full accountability of producers. Since ev-
ery content is signed by its producer, tracing the producer
responsible for generating content is a trivial task. However,
accountability can not be provided if content is served from
router caches. Consumers accountability, on the other hand,
can only be achieved when they issue signed interests, or
include their identities in the interests themselves. Otherwise,
accountability can not be provided.
Both MobilityFirst and XIA do not provide accountability
at the network layer. However, signing requests and responses
can provide this feature in a similar fashion to NDN, especially
for content principals. Also, IPsec-similar techniques can be
employed to provide accountability for other principal types.
G. Data confidentiality
The natural way to achieve data confidentiality at the
network layer is by using encryption.
IP does not provide data confidentiality. This is done by
using IPsec. The level of confidentiality depends on the mode
of operation. In transport mode, ESP only encrypts the IP
packet payload and data confidentiality is host-to-host. Tunnel
mode extends confidentiality to the entire encapsulated IP
packet, including both payload and header. However, data
confidentiality can only be achieved in host-to-gateway or
gateway-to-gateway scenarios. Also, ESP confidentiality is
not generally effective against active adversaries. It has been
demonstrated that achieving confidentiality without a strong
integrity mechanism, or even applying integrity before encryp-
tion, can only protect against passive adversaries [74]–[76].
Thus, even though IPsec provides confidentiality, poor usage
practices can negate its benefits.
Nebula’s ICING-based network layer does not natively
provide data confidentiality. Instead, it can be achieved by
combining ICING with end-to-end encryption of the packet
payload.
Data confidentiality in NDN can be attained by encrypting
content payload. This is not supported by the architecture and
is left to the application. However, even if content is encrypted,
the fact that it carries a human-readable name might leak
information about its data.
MobilityFirst and XIA provides content principal confi-
dentiality using methods similar to the those used in NDN.
Fortunately, and due to the fact that such principal identifiers
are generated using the hash of the content itself, inspecting
them does not leak information about the encrypted content.
Moreover, confidentiality of data communicated between host,
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network and service principals can be achieved using similar
techniques to IPsec.
H. Traffic flow confidentiality
It is well known that encryption does not protect against
statistical traffic analysis – attacks that monitor traffic in order
to extract properties, such as volume and timing [77].
IPsec provides some traffic flow confidentiality by padding
packet payloads to hide their size patterns. However, according
to IPsec specifications, this is not mandatory and, therefore,
may not be supported in all IPsec implementations [8].
NDN, MobilityFirst, Nebula and XIA are all susceptible to
traffic analysis attacks Fortunately, padding can be used to
provide traffic and flow confidentiality.
Another architecture-agnostic alternative is to add artificial
delays to communications to better hinder time-based attacks.
This, however, comes at the expense of increasing end-to-end
latency and reducing overall network performance, especially
for time-sensitive traffic.
I. Anonymous Communication
IP (with or without IPsec) does not support anonymous
communication. This is mainly because source and destination
addresses are in the clear in packet headers. However, partial
anonymity can be achieved using the tunnel mode of IPsec
along with ESP. This is because tunnel mode allows the ESP
protocol to encrypt the original IP packet along with the source
and destination addresses, and it encapsulates that packet into a
new one with a new header reflecting gateway addresses. This
combination hides end-host identities among the set of other
hosts connected to respective end-networks. However, this is
only effective if the adversary is eavesdropping on the link
between the two gateways and is not located inside one of the
end-networks. Furthermore, in case of host-to-gateway tunnel
mode, only anonymity of hosts located behind the gateway is
preserved.
Crowds [78] is one of the first proposals to achieve user
anonymity. In it, a message is randomly forwarded between
group members before it reaches its destination. Therefore,
none of the group members nor the end recipient learn the
actual source of the message. The Onion Router (TOR) [79]
is another method that provides anonymous communication
through a “circuit.” Circuits are multi-hop encrypted com-
munication channels established using at least three TOR
nodes. Theoretically, TOR guarantees anonymity with respect
to an adversary controlling, at most, two TOR nodes. How-
ever, flawed TOR implementations can reduce its provided
anonymity level [80].
Hosts anonymity is not provided by ICING-based Nebula.
By inspecting packet headers, eavesdroppers can easily de-
termine a packet’s source, as well as the path it traversed.
However, host anonymity can be achieved by replacing ICING
with TorIP [44], thus resulting in a level of anonymity similar
to that provided by TOR in today’s Internet.
Unlike IP, NDN has some features that facilitate anonymous
communication. A PIT allows interest messages and content
objects to only carry the requested content name without
any consumer-related information. However, Compagno et al.
show in [81] that adversaries with enough knowledge of the
network can determine consumer’s location. DiBenedetto et
al. proposed ANDa¯NA [82], a tool that provides a level of
anonymity similar to TOR, while requiring only two interme-
diate nodes, instead of three.
MobilityFirst and XIA suffer from the same privacy and
anonymity problems as IP. Packets contain both source and
destination GUIDs (or principal identifiers), thus revealing
the hosts involved. To make the matter worse, XIA packets
path can be revealed by inspecting their destination DAG
addresses. This is because such addresses might include (part
of) the path to the destination, as described in Section VI.
Due to the communication model similarity of these two
architectures to IP, approaches developed to preserve users
anonymity in IP networks can be adopted. For instance, TOR
can be used to protect MobilityFirst and XIA host principals’
anonymity. Preserving content principals’ anonymity can be
achieved using a protocol similar to ANDa¯NA in NDN [82].
J. Availability
Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS)
present a well known thread against availability. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss DoS and DDoS attacks that apply to
the network layer of the current as well as (some of) the
future Internet architectures discussed above. We also shed
the light on new (and possibly more serious) type of attacks
that the new architectures allow. We exclude discussing the
lack of availability due to network misconfigurations, disasters,
hardware and software faults, or any other causes that are not
a direct consequence of an attack.
Bandwidth depletion attacks. The current Internet architec-
ture is susceptible to bandwidth depletion attacks [83]. Their
goal is to exhaust bandwidth of a specific link. These attacks
can be mounted in two ways: (1) distributed – with packets
sent at low rate by each attacking node, or (2) centralized – a
single powerful adversary flooding the target link at high rate.
Due to today’s high bandwidth and redundancy, centralized
bandwidth depletion attacks are harder to mount.
Several mitigation and prevention techniques have been
proposed and implemented in the current Internet. Some
examples are: (1) tracing back traffic to the source of the
attack [84]–[86], (2) distinguishing between legitimate and
malicious traffic [87], [88], (3) using puzzles to increase the
cost for adversaries trying to consume bandwidth [89], [90],
and (4) using rate-limiting mechanisms for traffic that causes
congestion [91]–[93]. However, none can effectively defeat
this attack.
Bandwidth depletion in the data plane is harder to mount
in Nebula, because senders (adversaries) must obtain consent
of all nodes on a path before sending packets. Thus, unau-
thorized packets will be dropped by adversary-facing routers.
Unfortunately, this only shifts the attack from the network
layer to the consent servers and causes negative effects on
the network. The reason is because a single consent server
might be responsible for a large number of routers in its
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domain. Thus, lowering its ability of issuing PoCs can disable
all routers in that domain.
NDN design is more resilient to bandwidth depletion attacks
as compare to its IP counterpart. Recall that NDN communi-
cation adheres to the pull model, i.e., a content is forwarded
only in response to a corresponding previous interest. This
model prevents adversaries from flooding the network with
unsolicited content. In addition, flooding the network with a
large number of interests to cause bandwidth depletion is not
very effective due to the small size of interest packets.
Since MobilityFirst and XIA use a communication model
similar to IP, they both are susceptible to bandwidth depletion
attacks. Similar countermeasures applied in IP networks can
be adopted. However, they can only reduce the effect of these
attacks.
Nugraha et al. [94] suggested integrating STRIDE with XIA
to protect against DoS attacks. STRIDE [95] is an architecture
resilient to bandwidth depletion (D)DoS attacks. It modifies
SCION path establishment to perform a tree-based bandwidth
allocation. Whenever a trusted domain root initiates the path
establishment process, bandwidth is allocated as the path is
branching out as a tree from that root. This guarantees the
required bandwidth for benign flows. STRIDE also supports
long-term static paths to provide high available connectivity.
Routers resource exhaustion. Exhausting storage resources
of routers is another target for adversaries. NAT-enabled router
might assemble fragments in some scenarios. Reassembly
buffers in these routers can be exploited as follows. Each
fragment includes a 16-bit field to indicate the size of the
original packet. Adversaries can send a single fragment with
a large original packet size and never send the rest of the
fragments. This forces assembling routers to allocate a buffer
and wait for the rest of the packet to arrive. To make the
matter worse, adversaries can set the original packet size to
its maximum value, 64KB, thus allocating maximum buffers.
Computation resources of routers is another victim of ex-
haustion. Since ICING’s design requires the extensive use of
cryptographic operations, adversaries can send a large number
of packets to routers forcing them to perform all verification
operations described in Section III. Such attacks have very low
cost on adversaries since the latter can flood victim routers
with packets carrying invalid (e.g., randomly generated) PoC
and PoP values.
As mentioned above, PIT is one of the main router com-
ponents that enables content delivering without requiring any
form of consumer source addresses. PIT is also used for
interest collapsing in order to reduce bandwidth due to a burst
of closely-spaced interests for the same content. However,
the fact that PIT is a limited and valuable resource makes
it susceptible to malicious exhaustion. Adversaries can send a
large number of interests attempting to fill the PIT. To avoid
collapsing, such interests can refer to nonsensical content.
Once the PIT is full, a router can either: (1) drop incoming
interests, or (2) remove old PIT entries to make space for
new ones. Both options, however, can adversely impact past or
future interests. This type of attack is called Interest Flooding
(IF) [96], [97].
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive remedy for IF at-
tacks. Although several countermeasures have been proposed,
they are ineffective against smart adversaries and only manage
to lower the volume of IF attacks [98]–[100]. One possible
remedy for IF attacks is to eliminate the PIT – its root cause.
For this reason, [101] suggests a modified Content-Centric
Networking (CCN) architecture without router PITs.
Cache-related attacks. Regardless of the aforementioned
benefits of in-network caching, it opens the door for new types
of DoS attacks that do not exist in today’s Internet network
layer: content poisoning and cache pollution. In the following
we describe the resiliency of NDN, MobilityFirst, and XIA
against these attacks. We exclude Nebula since its design does
not provide in-network caching.
a) Content poisoning: Content poisoning attacks occurs
when adversaries inject fake content into router caches. A
fake content is not generated by a benign producer and,
consequently, does not satisfy user requests. If such content
is cached in routers, it is used to reply to future benign user
requests.
The fact that NDN adheres to the pull model makes it
harder, but still feasible, for adversaries to inject fake content
into router caches. There are two methods to achieve this:
• Reactive: the adversary Adv is a node eavesdropping or
controlling a link, e.g., an upstream malicious router. Adv
responds to interests on that links with a fake content that
is cached in all downstream routers.
• Proactive: this method involves Adv that, anticipating
demand for certain content, issues one or more bogus
interests (perhaps from strategically placed zombie con-
sumers), before genuine interests are issued. Adv then
replies with fake content (from a set of compromised
routers or compromised producers) thus pre-poisoning the
caches of all routers forwarding the bogus interests.
What facilitates this attack is the fact that content signature
verification is not mandatory by routers. This is because not
only signature verification is an expensive operation at line
speed, variant trust models adopted by different applications
renders trusting public (verifying) keys a challenge. Even if we
assume that routers can know about all possible trust models,
some might incur heavy and expensive network operations.
For instance, PKI hierarchy requires routers to iteratively fetch
and verify public keys until a trusted anchor is reached. Such
an impractical approach significantly reduces the network
performance.
Ghali et al. identifies in [67], the root causes and proposes
a solution for content poisoning. The main idea is to have
consumers and producers collaborate in providing routers
with enough trust contextual information to perform a single
signature verification.5 This process is formalized by a rule
called the Interest Key Binding (IKB) rule.
An alternative solution is the use of SCNs. By definition, a
SCN contains a value that (uniquely) identifies the principal
it is referring to. In case of content principal in MobilityFirst
and XIA, and content objects in NDN, SCNs contain the hash
5We assume that in the future, public key operations will be available at
the hardware level.
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of the data itself. When users request content using SCNs, the
network guarantees that the requested content will be correctly
delivered. As a result, MobilityFirst and XIA eliminate the
effects of content poisoning attacks by design. It is worth
mentioning that using SCNs does not prevent adversaries from
injecting fake content in router caches. Instead, it guarantees
that benign users will not receive such fake content.
b) Cache pollution: Pollution is another type of (D)DoS
attacks against router caches. In such attacks, adversaries
attempt to manipulate reference locality of caches, causing
incorrect decisions made by cache eviction strategies. This
causes routers to possibly evict popular content reducing the
overall content distribution performance. NDN, MobilityFirst,
and XIA are all susceptible to this attack.
Conti et al. discuss this attack in [102]. It is shown that
with even limited adversarial resources, a highly effective
cache pollution attack can be mounted. In fact, even small
cache locality manipulation can cause a significant content
distribution disruption [103]. It is also shown in [102] that
launching pollution attacks on large networks is relatively easy,
and smart adversaries reduce the effectiveness of proposed
countermeasures.
Cache pollution attacks do not prevent users from retrieving
the requested data. Instead, they negatively effect the perfor-
mance of content distribution, and eliminate the benefits of
in-network caching.
VIII. RESOLUTION SERVICES SECURITY
Resolution service is a fundamental part of the current In-
ternet architecture. It maps human-readable names to routable
network addresses. As mentioned above, new Internet archi-
tectures also require similar resolution services to operate. In
this section we compare the security and privacy features of
the various resolution services proposed in FIA projects. We
exclude Nebula and XIA since they do not propose a new
resolution service and only exploit the existing DNS/DNSSEC.
We consider the following security features: trust, data
origin authentication, data integrity, peer entity authentication,
authorization and access control, accounting, data confidential-
ity and availability. We consciously exclude traffic flow con-
fidentiality and anonymous communication since we believe
they should be provided at the network layer.
A. Trust
DNSSEC introduces the notion of trust into DNS. It
considers authoritative servers as trusted entities responsible
of maintaining and securely providing the correct mapping
between human-readable domain names and corresponding IP
addresses. Recall that each DNSSEC server signs the resource
records (name-to-IP mappings) of its respective domain. Trust-
worthiness of such servers is ensured by a chain-of-trust model
that resembles the domains hierarchical organization. The top-
level domain resides at the root of this chain.
Similar to DNSSEC, NDNS applies the same notion. Au-
thoritative server are trusted entities and their trustworthiness
is ensured by a similar chain-of-trust model.
GNRS, on the other hand, adopts a different approach.
Every network is responsible of providing signed GUID-
NA mappings. Thus, verifying these signatures ensures their
validity. This also prevents (compromised) GNRS from ma-
nipulating GUID-NA mappings without being detected.
B. Data-origin authentication and data integrity
DNSSEC provides data-origin authentication and data in-
tegrity by requiring: (1) authoritative servers to sign each of
their resource records, and (2) resolvers to verify the validity
of these signatures and their corresponding public keys. This
prevents adversaries from injecting bogus data into the DNS
system.
Signing every response resource record is an expensive op-
eration that authoritative server should not perform at run-time.
Adversaries can abuse such costly operation to launch (D)DoS
attacks against authoritative servers. To this end, resource
record signatures should always be generated in advance.
While this method can be easily applied in case resolvers asks
for existing domain names, it does not work for a non-existing
domain names. DNS uses the NXDOMAIN resource records
to inform a resolver that the queried name does not exist.
However, providing data-origin authentication and integrity for
NXDOMAIN resource records can not be done by generating
the signature in advance, because of the number of possible
non-existing names is infinite. To solve this problem, DNSSEC
introduces a new record type called the NextSECure (NSEC)
resource record. Specifically, assuming a canonical ordering of
the domain names, a NSEC record contains two consecutive
existing names in the canonical ordering, thus describing the
gaps between them. Such records are signed and used as
authenticated denial of existence for non-existing names. Since
NSEC records contain existing names, their signatures can be
calculated a priori.
In NDNS, query responses are carried in content object
payloads, thus data-origin authentication and integrity is in-
herited from NDN. One difference between DNSSEC and
NDNS resides in the granularity of these authentication and
integrity guarantees. While DNSSEC can offer such security
properties per individual resource record or resource record
set, the fact that a NDNS record is carried in a content object
can only guarantee the authentication and integrity of said
record. Although this is a clear restriction in the flexibility and
scalability of the protocol, it does not jeopardize its security
[53].
In order to overcome DoS attacks due to requests for non-
existing names, NDNS adopts methods similar to DNSSEC. In
particular, NDNS servers can sign the gaps between existing
names. Furthermore, Compagno et al. proposed in [104] the
use of a Bloom filter [105] to defeat the aforementioned DoS
attacks. This, however, requires some changes in the NDN
architecture as well as the introduction of a new content type.
GNRS also provides data-origin authentication and integrity
by means of GUID-NA mapping signatures. The main differ-
ent between GNRS and DNSSEC is that the former does not
assume that GNRS servers are trusted [60], while the latter
requires all authoritative servers to be trusted.
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C. Peer entity authentication
In DNS and DNSSEC there is no entity authentication
between a resolver and a DNS server. Resolvers usually know
the IP address of a DNS server which is used to initiate
queries. Usually, such IP address is manually configured on
the resolver or obtained through DHCP and considered valid.
Using a TLS connection between resolvers and DNS servers
can provide entity authentication [106], [107].
Authentication between DNS servers is obtained through
Transaction signatures (TSIG) [57]. TSIG involves pairwise
keys shared among DNS servers and used to secure dynamic
updates, zone transfers and recursive queries. Moreover, in
case of dynamic updates generated from DNS clients, a
signature is used to authenticate that client and validate the
update.
NDNS follows the same approach of DNS by not providing
entity authentication. However, the fact that both NDNS
users and servers are regular NDN consumers and producers,
respectively, allows approaches similar to what is proposed in
Section VII-C to be adopted. Furthermore, securing dynamic
updates requires NDNS clients to have previously shared their
certificate with the NDNS servers. Signing the updates will
then authenticate them.
Unlike DNS and NDNS, GNRS authenticates every client
issuing requests (query, update and delete) by retrieving the
corresponding certificate, from NCS, and verifying the GUID
authenticity. GNRS clients can ensure server authentication by
performing similar steps, requesting certificates from NCS and
verifying servers identities.
D. Authorization and access control
Both DNS/DNSSEC and NDNS do not provide any form of
access control. All resource records are publicly available to
every host in the network. However, authorization and access
control is provided for dynamic updates.
GNRS does not follow the same trend and consider access
control a crucial part of its design. Specifically, GNRS stores a
set of access control policies along with GUID-NA mappings.
Such policies regulate access to particular GNRS resources
by specifying read and write permissions which blacklist and
whitelist certain user GUIDs.
E. Accountability
DNS/DNSSEC guarantees accountability only for secure
DNS dynamic updates [35]. This is because such requests
must in fact be signed by their originators. Also, NDNS does
not provide any mechanism for accountability. The fact that
NDNS users and servers are consumers and producers allows
the adoption of similar approaches described in Section VII-F.
GNRS uses a different approach and mandates GNRS
clients to sign every request. By doing so, accountability is
provided for all insert, update and query requests.
F. Data confidentiality
Neither DNS nor DNSSEC provide confidentiality. Queries
and resource records are never encrypted by authoritative
servers and are always exchanged in cleartext. One way of
achieving confidentiality in DNS/DNSSEC is to establish a
TLS session between resolvers and authoritative servers [106],
[107].
Similarly, both NDNS and GNRS designs do not take confi-
dentiality into consideration. Fortunately, similar approaches to
using TLS channels can be adopted. This feature is important
to provide private communication
G. Availability
As a public available service, DNS is subject to (D)DoS
attacks which jeopardize its availability. In particular, adver-
saries can flood authoritative servers with a large number of
query requests to exhaust their resources.6 Although the use
of DNS caching and redundancy servers reduce the effect
of DDoS, a number of such attacks have been successfully
directed against root and top-level DNS servers in past years
[108]–[110]. Many solutions have been presented in past years
that either: (1) require some changes in the DNS protocol
[111]–[114], or (2) propose new resolution services [115],
[116]. Nowadays, DNS uses a single approach that does not
require any modification to its architecture, which is the adop-
tion of “Anycast” [117]. In this case, a single DNS server is
replicated in different geographically locations among several
ASes. Therefore, routing protocols forward DNS requests to
the nearest server that can satisfy them [118]. However, this
approach can not achieve an efficient load balancing because
it does not consider replica workloads and network traffic.
DNS resolvers (not implementing DNSSEC protocol) can
be the target of cache poisoning attacks. This attack is similar,
in concept, to content poisoning described in Section VII-J.
In DNS cache poisoning attacks, the goal of the adversary
is to inject spoofed responses (name-IP mappings) in the
resolver caches [119]. Injecting false DNS responses can
be achieved using a man-in-the-middle attack in which the
adversary satisfies requests with false DNS responses [119].
The introduction of data-origin authentication in DNSSEC
allows resolvers to verify the origin of data in DNS response,
thus eliminating this attack.
NDNS follows the same hierarchical design of DNS. In
principles NDNS authoritative servers seems to offer the same
level of resilience to DDoS as DNS authoritative servers.
Furthermore, NDNS envisions the use of a set of secondary
servers to balance the workload, which was proven to be
not effective. The same anycast approach used in DNS could
be employed in NDNS. Such forwarding strategy must be
implemented by NDN routers. Moreover, NDNS is susceptible
to content poisoning attacks. Fortunately, the same counter-
measures described in VII-J can be effective.
GNRS design appears to be more resilient to DDoS than
DNS design. In fact, GNRS does not adopt a hierarchical
structure, instead it distributes the GUID-NA mappings among
a number of replicas using Distributed Hashtables (DHT)
maintained by all the ASes in the Internet. This allows GNRS
to easily scale and distribute a DDoS attack.
6The use of secure dynamic updates involving asymmetric encryption
increases the effect of the attack.
M. AMBROSIN ET AL. 17
IX. LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section we summarize all the security and privacy
features provided by the network layer of the FIA architectures
and their corresponding resolution services. We also highlight
the missing features and delineate a direction for future work
on security and privacy in both network layer and resolution
services.
A. Network Layer
The strong requirement to include security and privacy by
design seems to have been only partially reached by FIA
funded projects. Table I summarizes the security and privacy
features provided by each architecture.
Nebula. At its current state, Nebula includes trust, data origin
authentication, peer entity authentication, data integrity, au-
thorization and access control, accountability, and availability
features. All of them are provided between senders and routers
implementing ICING, expect for peer entity authentication that
is guaranteed between senders and consent servers during the
retrieval of the PoCs. With respect to IP and IPsec, Nebula
certainly increases the security of intra-domain communica-
tion. However, it lacks to consider inter-domain and end-to-
end communication security. While current approaches can be
adopted, e.g., establishing an IPsec-like secure communication
between two end hosts, researcher should investigate these two
directions further.
Availability in Nebula is provided by path verification mech-
anism which prevents any adversary from sending unrequested
data to perform bandwidth depletion attacks. However, ICING
nodes and consent servers could be the target of a DoS attack,
due to the heavy use of cryptographic operations. Consent
servers can be another target for DoS attacks. In particular,
an adversary can flood a server with an abnormal amount of
request. If the target server controls a large number of routers,
the attack can effectively disable all of them. We believe that
such attack deserves further investigation.
Other analyzed features, i.e., data confidentiality, traffic
flow confidentiality and anonymous communication, are not
currently provided. The first two can be easily implemented
by applying the same well-known technique used in IP/IPsec.
However, Nebula should investigate and make these features
available by design before any adoption in the real world.
Furthermore, anonymous communications contradict with the
current design of ICING which requires path establishment
for each communication. Therefore, further investigation is
required by the research community to provide anonymity in
Nebula.
NDN. This architecture replaces hosts as primary entity in
the network with content. This affect the security features
provided at network layer by focusing them on content rather
than end-hosts. Currently, NDN provides: trust, data origin
authentication, data integrity and data confidentiality. Security
features like peer entity authentication and accountability are
available only when derived from data origin authentication
for both interest and content. Ubiquitous caching further com-
plicates achieving these two features. In fact, when a consumer
obtains a content from an intermediate router’s cache, there is
currently no way to provide peer entity authentication between
the consumer and the router providing the content. Similarly,
accountability for content refers to the producer generating
that content and not to any intermediate router serving it from
its cache.
Availability is a security feature in which NDN provides
some improvements as compared to IP/IPsec but at the same
time it opens the door for new types of attacks. While the pull
model communication prevents any adversary from flooding
a host with non-requested content, adversaries can exhaust
router states (i.e., PIT and CS), decreasing the performance of
a network. Even through several countermeasures have been
proposed, none of them has been chosen and implemented as
part of the architecture.
The remaining security features: authorization and access
control, traffic flow confidentiality and anonymous communi-
cation are not provided by the network layer. Even if ACL can
be implemented, NDN chooses to delegate access control to
the application layer by encrypting content and distributing
the decryption keys only to authorized consumers. Traffic
flow confidentiality and anonymous communication are not
available but existing approaches designed for IP and IPsec can
be applied without any modification of the NDN architecture.
MobilityFirst. The security features provided by this architec-
ture combine in principle the end-to-end hosts approach and
the content-based approach of IP/IPsec and NDN, respectively.
However, at the current state, MobilityFirst seems to fully
provide only few security features, i.e., trust, authorization
and access control. The adoption of self-certifying names to
address hosts facilitates the implementation of data origin
authentication, peer entity authentication, and accountability.
Peer entity authentication can be achieved involving a simple
challenge-response protocol between the two peers. While
this guarantees end-to-end accountability, it is not enough to
provide network accountability. In order to achieve that, edge
routers should prevent address spoofing.
Data integrity and data confidentiality are currently not
provided at network layer and it is not clear if MobilityFirst
approach is to let applications deal with them. Traffic flow
confidentiality and anonymous communication are also not
provided. Existing approaches designed for IP/IPsec can be
easily imported. However, we encourage a deeper investigation
in order to design new techniques able to exploit the peculiar-
ity of the new architecture.
The current design of MobilityFirst can help against content
poisoning attacks (i.e., the use of SCN prevents a benign user
from receiving fake content). Meanwhile, MobilityFirst does
not seem to have fully considered other network attacks such
as bandwidth depletion attacks and cache pollution attacks.
Existing solutions can be applied to mitigate these problems.
We believe a further investigation is worth being conducted in
order to provide some new and architecture-related counter-
measures.
XIA. The main goal of this architecture is to support com-
munication between multiple and different principals. XIA
security approach extends, de-facto, the MobilyFirst approach
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Security and Privacy Features
Network layers
Nebula NDN MobilityFirst XIA
Trust 3 3 3 3
Data Origin Authentication } 3 7 7
Peer entity Authentication } } } }
Data Integrity } 3 7 7
Authorization and Access Control 3 } } }
Accountability 3 } } }
Data Confidentiality 7 3 7 7
Traffic Flow Confidentiality 7 7 7 7
Anonymous Communication 7 7 7 7
Availability } } } }
TABLE I
NETWORK LAYER SECURITY AND PRIVACY COMPARISON. 3INDICATES THAT THE FEATURE IS FULLY CONSIDERED AND AVAILABLE IN THE
ARCHITECTURE. 7INDICATES THAT THE FEATURE IS NOT AVAILABLE AND NOT CONSIDERED IN THE ARCHITECTURE. } INDICATES THAT THE FEATURE
IS PARTIALLY AVAILABLE OR THE ARCHITECTURE PROVIDES SOME MECHANISMS TO FACILITATE IMPLEMENTING THE FEATURE BY THE APPLICATION.
in which security is provided and designed for two principals:
content and hosts. XIA does not limit the number of principals
but instead provides the freedom to design new ones. To this
end, XIA security is based on each principal intrinsic security
feature.
The current state of XIA offers the same security and
privacy features as MobilityFirst. This is due to their similar
approach in addressing principals using SCNs.
B. Resolution Services
Resolution services are of a primary importance in both
the current Internet architecture and the new FIA proposals.
In Nebula, the resolution service is used by the NVENT to
perform path discovery. In NDN, the same service provides the
mapping between namespaces and the corresponding security
information. In MobilityFirst, the resolution service is actively
involved in any communication guaranteeing the binding be-
tween GUIDs and NAs. Finally, XIA’s DNS-based resolution
service is used for the address/path resolution.
Although all architectures requires a resolution service, only
NDN and MobilityFirst are actually investigating their own
proposal. In Table II we summarize the security and privacy
features provided by NDNS and GNRS.
NDNS. NDNS design reflects in many part the design of
DNS without bringing too much novelty. NDNS involves the
same notion of trust of DNSSEC in which servers are trusted
entities. Moreover, NDNS queries and responses provide: data
origin authentication, data integrity, accountability only in
case of dynamic updates, and availability. The last feature is
provided by server replication. However, while in DNSSEC
the “Anycast” technique is used to choose the closes server to
the resolver, in NDNS the network must be aware of all servers
and implement specific forwarding strategies to balance the
requests among them, which adds more complexities.
Peer entity authentication, authorization and access control,
and data confidentiality are not provided. We believe that
NDNS deserves further investigation to provide better avail-
ability, as well as the missing security features.
GNRS. The GNRS design is completely different from the
current DNS and DNSSEC. In fact MobilityFirst assumes
a flat name structure which forces GNRS to assume a flat
structure for its servers. This different organization has some
side effects on the provided security features: servers are not
assumed to be trusted entities and, data origin authentication
is provided by the owner of the GUID and not by servers.
GNRS also introduces authorization and access control of its
stored information and provides accountability and peer entity
authentication in every query and response. Finally, GNRS is
more robust to DoS attacks than DNS. First, compromising
one server does not affect others. Second, GNRS is designed
to easily adapt to network changes and to balance GUID-NA
mapping among many replicas based on requests locality.
We believe that GNRS introduces good security improve-
ment with respect to the current DNS and DNSSEC. However,
the only missing feature is data confidentiality.
X. CONCLUSION
Despite the unquestionable success of the current IP-based
Internet architecture, the lack of security considerations in its
design lead to many severe security breaches and privacy leak-
ages for many years. One goal of future Internet architectures
is to include security and privacy features that are missing in
the design of the current Internet.
In this survey, we provided a thorough analysis of security
and privacy features currently supported by the network layer
of four architectures involved in the FIA program: Nebula,
NDN, MobilityFirst and XIA. We focused on features we
believe should be available at the network layer in order to
achieve secure and private communication. We considered
IP/IPsec as a point of reference in our analysis. Moreover,
we included resolution services provided by the different
architectures since each one can not abstain from relying on
such a service.
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